found in the auto pact, and have largely ignored the issue of state-industry relations or even questions of conflict within the automotive industry itself. The focus is on the negotiations between the representatives of Canada and the United States as they sought to achieve their goals. Each country had their favoured outcomes, and each looked to achieve those outcomes. Clearly, the state plays a key role in the creation of auto policy, but has also had an impact on actors within industrial relations, such as labour and business.
The role of the state in other countries in this period has also been examined, and is helpful for understanding the Canadian environment. As in Canada, during the 1960s governments in Australia, Brazil, Mexico, and other Latin American countries also took a much more active role in their auto industries. All of these countries shared common traits with Canada's auto industry: widespread penetration by American multinational auto companies, little or weak domestic manufacture and parts production, and balance of payments difficulties. In response, the range of intervention by these host countries included increased local content rules, wholesale nationalization of industry (or the threat thereof), and innovative approaches to import-substitution. These efforts met with varying levels of success, and provide comparative approaches to state intervention in national auto industries. 4 Studies of the auto industry in other locales provide insights into the Canadian situation. Helen Shapiro's Engines of Growth: The State and Transnational Auto Companies in Brazil argues that neither the neo-classical market-oriented nor the state-centric, institutional approaches are adequate to explain the success of the Brazilian state in intervening in the auto industry in the 1960s. The neo-classical market-oriented approach views free trade and domestic laissez-faire as the only way to effectively build a viable auto industry, and argues that import-substitution and government intervention in the marketplace distort economic performance and lead to inefficiency. The state-centric approach, while not denying the importance of the marketplace, argues that a government's active role in supporting and seeking outcomes for an industry, including disciplining private industry, are key to the improvement of an auto sector. Indeed, Brazil utilized infant-industry and import substitution methods to improve production, but encouraged foreign capital to build its domestic industry. In the case of Brazil, then, state-directed goals for the domestic auto industry were limited to some degree by vagaries of market-driven transnational corporations. Nonetheless, Brazilian industry, which was virtually In their analysis of the Mexican auto industry, Transnational Corporations Versus the State: The Political Economy of the Mexican Auto Industry, Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe outline three different approaches to understanding the role of the state. In the Marxist approach, the state is predisposed to capitalism. A strain of this view, the instrumentalist approach, sees the state as a tool of die ruling class. A second view of the state is the pluralist/behavioural model. This approach views the state as a neutral arena, wherein the state has no agency of its own, all others being actors within the state, though the state is not an actor itself. A third view is die historical-structural, in which the state has power and exercises it within a structured environment which is conditioned by past circumstance. Bennett and Sharpe's definition of the historical-structural model bears repeating: understanding how the state acquires its interest and power means understanding die state as an actor involved in national and international structures -a world capitalist system, a system of nation states, a national economic and class system, and a particular culture. This approach is necessarily historical, because the state's experiences with other actors and structures will determine whether the state is coherent or fragmented in its actions and what specific interests, what power or weaknesses, it has. At the same time, the approach is inherently structural; it denies die voluntarism mat sees die state as an actor that chooses and acts wholly freely, viewing the state instead as an actor whose interest and power are shaped by structures. It can transform structures, but only within limits mat are themselves historically structured. 6 The Mexican government -after threatening to nationalize the industry outright -forced the multinationals in its 1962 and 1969 automotive decrees to increase their local content and to focus on export production. In doing so, government intervention was only partially successful in improving me sector, as internal and external factors, namely the resistance of the multinationals, the realities of productivity and efficiency levels in Mexico, and international competitive restraints, constrained the effectiveness of Mexican policy. 7 These important cases help to inform and shape any understanding of the Canadian state's role in the auto industry in the period, and its interaction with players such as the Canadian UAW. The Shapiro model forme Brazilian intervention shows that neither unrestrained market forces nor direct state intervention were the only choices state planners faced in developing policies towards the auto industry. Similarly, the Bennett-Sharp historical-structural approach for the Mexican state's interaction with the industry has strong echoes of the Canadian experience. In shaping its auto policy, the Canadian state was not a mere functionary of capital, nor was it without any agency of its own. The Canadian state did make choices, but these were tempered by the international, national, and historical experiences that the Canadian state and its representatives understood along with the other actors within their environment. 8 Canada's case in the 1960s was fundamentally different from these examples for one significant reason. Canadian policy-makers sought a solution to their auto industry concerns which moved in the opposite direction of national actors in other countries: where other countries sought greater national control over their industries, Canadian policy-makers sought to tie their industry's fate to that of another nation on a continental basis. In Brazil and Mexico, the onus was on import-substitution, local content, nationalization, or the threat of nationalization in the name of greater domestic control. In the Canadian case, state actors did seek to improve Canadian production though content requirements and increased investment, but within the context of a continentally-integrated industry, one which reflected the economic and political realities which Canadian policy-makers faced. For Canadian state planners working on the auto industry, "economic nationalism" ultimately took the form of continentalism. 9 This continental approach provoked a storm of controversy within Canadian politics, one which was fuelled by concerns over continued US domination of Canada's industrial economy. These concerns were emphasized by a new breed of economic nationalists in the 1960s who argued that Canada had become dependent on the US, and that Canadian sovereignty was curtailed at every turn by the domination of US policy concerns, which forced Canadians to follow the American line. George Grant's Lament for a Nation epitomized the belief that Canada was no longer a sovereign nation, and other writers such as Kari Levitt published popular works which For views on the Canadian state and economic development, see also H.G. Aitken, "Defen- (Ottawa 1986) . The Canadian auto pact negotiators nonetheless effectively used the state intervention models espoused by economic nationalists and practised by countries such as Mexico to contrast their own position to American officials and Big Three representatives as they searched for a way to resolve their own auto sector difficulties. In the words of one American negotiator, the Canadians kept "the sombrero under the table," and continually reminded the US that if the negotiations failed to achieve their preferred outcomes, they might have recourse to measures such as the harsh Mexican decrees imposed on the US multinationals. Joseph S. Nye, "Transnational Relations and Interstate Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis, " International Organization, 28 (Autumn, 1974) , 987.
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Notwithstanding this rhetoric, the auto pact did not fall readily into the dependency mould. Instead of being imposed by Americans for explicitly American gain, the auto pact was created following unilateral Canadian attempts to manipulate tar- iff rates in order to boost productivity in the Canadian auto industry and restore the imbalance in US-Canadian trade. In economist Carl Beigie's words, the agreement evolved "as a response to a series of policy moves in which Canada has played the role of initiator and the United States the role of reactor."
13 It is also clear that US policy makers wished to create a classic free-trade arrangement with the Canadians in the North American auto industry, a plan that was scuttled by Canadian stubbornness. Instead, the auto pact which emerged managed to achieve all the Canadian goals which had been hoped for under the earlier plans, and more. Nor did the agreement solely reflect the wishes of the companies. As one US official dryly noted concerning the Canadian government-industry side agreements, they expected the multinationals to push a harder bargain with Canada. 4 The Canadian government demonstrated considerable agency in initiating the process and negotiating the auto agreement.
Nonetheless, the issue of Canadian dependency and the American auto industry, and the dependency of Canadian auto workers on the American auto union, struck a powerful chord in the 1960s. These passionate debates about the nature and future of Canadian economic policy, over the nature of Canada's relationship with the United States, and the nature of the Canadian union's relationship with its American-based International, found their way into discourse employed by elements of the Canadian UAW, and had a significant impact on the union's position on the question of state intervention in the changing Canadian auto industry.
II. The Canadian UAW and Government Automotive Policy:
The Bladen Commission, Remission Programs, and the Auto Pact, 1960-65 Before 1965, the Canadian and American auto industries were identical and interdependent, but distinctive. Created largely as branch operations at the beginning of the century, the US-owned Canadian manufacturers had replicated their production along American lines. In order to offer the same multitude of models as their American parent companies, Canadian manufacturers built cars in very short production runs, with costly downtimes as plants retooled. As a result, although they shared the same international union and built many of the same models, Canadian UAW members were paid less to build fewer and more costly cars. However, because of the postwar boom, by the 1950s the Canadian Region was the UAW's fastest growing section. In Canada, it was among the country's largest unions, and its concentration 
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The American official complained "We knew about the Canadian plan to blackjack the companies, but we expected the companies to be harder bargainers. They didn't have to give away so much. It must have been profitable for them." Quoted from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York 1989), 207. and vast numbers in the automotive-producing belt of southern and south-western Ontario placed it at the forefront of Canadian labour.
A slowdown in the Canadian economy by the late 1950s had devastating effects on the auto industry. Smaller, less costly European and Japanese imports flooded the market and by 1960 nearly a third of cars sold in Canada were imports. At the same time, Canadian automotive exports which had helped fuel the industry after the war, declined significantly as foreign countries recovered after 1945. The impact on the industry and the UAW was profound, and between 1955 and 1960 the union lost nearly a fifth of its membership, or 6,000 workers.
13 (See Table 1 ) The Canadian auto industry was also hurting the country's finances. An archaic tariff structure resulted in a no-win situation: The Canadian Big Three of GM, Ford, and Chrysler could import any parts not made in Canada duty-free, leaving inefficient Canadian manufacturers to produce only a number of protected parts. If demand for cars was high, American parts imports would increase, leading to a massive deficit with the US. If demand for cars was low, Canadian parts makers suffered. The result was that Canada's current account deficit increased dramatically as Canadian demand returned in the early 1960s, creating an automotive trade deficit with the US of over $400 million. Clearly, something had to be done to help a sick industry.
16 (See Table 2 ) The Canadian UAW was the first to raise the alarm and demand changes. In July 1960, George Burt led a delegation to Ottawa to press John Diefenbaker's Conser- 15 Yates, 94. 16 The 1936 Tariff Act which still governed the auto trade in 1960 dictated that in order to gain duty-free access for a selection of imported parts, a company was required to achieve 40 per cent Commonwealth content for companies producing 10,000 units, 50 per cent for companies producing between 10,000 and 20,000 units and 60 per cent for companies producing over 20,000 vehicles. The tariff schedule had the effect of facilitating some Canadian production, though the parts made in Canada were usually much more expensive than their US equivalents. At the same time, the duty-free status granted to any parts of a "class or kind" not made in Canada allowed the manufacturers to import substantial amounts of expensive parts, particularly main body stampings and complex transmissions. This hurt Canada's trade balance considerably in the 1960s. vative government to address the union's concerns, resulting in a meeting with the prime minister and cabinet The UAW'S presentation, "How Canadians Can Get a Made-In-Canada Car they Want and Can Afford" called for a nationalistic approach to the industry, and blamed the manufacturers for the current state of the industry. The union declared that the Canadian government must "protect the Canadian people": it could do so by encouraging small car builders to set up plants in Canada, and by boosting required Canadian content from 60 to 75 per cent for those companies producing more than 20,000 units. Paradoxically, at the same time the UAW argued that the "feasibility of closer integration with the us industry" should be explored. More specifically, the union suggested that no tariffs be imposed on products used by companies "which allocated an appropriate proportion, relative to sales in Canada, of its total production in Canadian plants." 1 While the UAW's idea of a "restricted free trade area" was not 21 An English-bom economist, Bladen was considered fair-minded by both industry and government representatives. 22 During his investigation, Bladen received numerous suggestions from the industry, and three submissions from the union as well. Bladen's final report suggested a novel concept, the "extended content" plan: Bladen recognized mat the only way for the Canadian industry to become more productive and efficient was to increase its exports dramatically, and recommended that die government allow companies to import autos and parts duty-free as long as a certain percentage of Canadian content was achieved. Canadian-made original equipment parts would qualify as content whether used in Canada or exported to another country. Instead of focusing on certain parts, the percentage of duty-free could be used anywhere in the product, thus giving the manufacturer a certain flexibility. The plan would also have the benefit, Bladen argued, of keeping prices within "politically acceptable limits." Drury was Finance Minister Walter Gordon's brother-in-law. While Drury claimed that the objectives of the plan were to increase employment, improve Canada's balance of payments problems, and to allow manufacturers longer production runs and greater specialization, it is clear that the Liberals' main concern was to improve the current account deficit. But they were also convinced that the improvements to employment and industry were attractive side benefits to the program. toward a continental auto deal. Feeling that he would be kept abreast of developments owing to his pledge to keep quiet on the remission plan, Burt was surprised to discover, in early October 1964, that the two governments had come to a larger agreement on the issue. Burt complained to Martin that since the union had given assurances that it would make no public announcements on the matter, he should have been notified about such an important development before he read about it in the Toronto Star. Burt was especially incensed to discover that the plan being considered was similar to the union leadership's recommendation to the Bladen Commission, a proposal which the union had not even been consulted upon.
17
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By December 1964 the agreement was essentially completed, and the union was still being ignored by the government. When press reports indicated that there was no provision for any worker protection plans, Burt was determined to ensure that workers would not be left solely to "the tender mercies of free enterprise." Drury agreed to meet Burt early in 1965, but when union representatives heard rumours that the agreement was to go into effect 1 January, Burt complained to Drury that the UAW was being left like a "pig in a poke." Although the union leadership had supported the idea of integration since the Bladen Commission, it could not agree to a treaty that did not provide worker protection. "At this moment," Burt complained, "we do not know what the plan is, but we have been given a clear impression that it contains none of the protections for workers who will be displaced." Based on this, Burt urged the minister to stop die agreement's implementation.
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At an 8 January Ottawa meeting, UAW officials were finally told by senior civil servants how the plan would work. The new regime would significantly benefit the Big Three, as the companies would be able to rationalize their production on a continent-wide basis in return for meeting certain production and content requirements. Government officials held that the plan would boost production, which would necessarily increase employment, and mat union representatives had nothing to worry about. The government would not, however, provide safeguards against the expected initial dislocation of workers as the two industries were integrated, claiming that only a very small percentage of workers in the industry would be affected.
33
Leading UAW figures felt that this was simply not good enough. The only acceptable worker protection program, insisted union representatives, would cover six specific issues: an earnings related adjustment benefit payable during the transitional period; transfer allowances for those workers required to relocate; preferen- tial hiring tricing into consideration seniority and wage levels; federal government action to prevent age discrimination so that older workers would not be refused employment upon relocation; advance notice of any large-scale dislocation by the auto companies; and a boost in supplementary pension benefits for those workers who lost credit during the period they spent unemployed. Finally, the union insisted that the government create a tripartite labour-government-management board to oversee the agreement.
34
In response, Drury pressed the union representatives to support the agreement, citing the UAW's own pro-integration submission to the Bladen Commission. Though union officials were "much more optimistic" of the success of the program following the meeting, it was impossible for them to support the plan if it did not contain any worker protection provisions. Union leaders left Ottawa with a sinking feeling and reported that "it was made apparent that, with or without our support," the agreement was to be implemented in the very near future.
35
The agreement was indeed announced without further union input The auto pact consisted of two parts: an agreement between Canada and the United States; and a number of side agreements, or "letters of undertaking" between the government of Canada and the Canadian Big Three. In return for granting the major manufacturers duty free trade across the border, the new regime would ensure that a certain amount of Canadian content and production was maintained through a number of mechanisms that penalized companies if they did not continue to build as many vehicles as they sold in Canada, as well as maintaining a certain amount of Canadian content in those vehicles. The companies were also to invest an additional $260 million in their Canadian operations by 1968, the approximate amount that Canadian officials expected to have been achieved under the duty remission program. The UAW'S official response to the agreement came from Solidarity House in Detroit. Publicly, Reuther reiterated Burt's position: the union was in agreement with the principles of the deal, but support would depend on whether adequate worker protection legislation was to be implemented -on both sides of the border. 37 Privately, senior American UAW officials were somewhat wary of the agreement. Reuther, however, was determined to wait to see what legislation the government would table, and how the agreement would affect the industry over the short Canada as a launch pad for their exports. The agreement was to be reviewed after three years, and while it was of "unlimited duration," it could be terminated by either party as long as twelve-months notice was given.
The side agreements with the Canadian manufacturers indicated the government's desire to ensure production in Canada. The companies promised to increase their CVA by 60 per cent of the value of any expansion of consumption by cars, and 50 per cent of any increase of consumption of its commercial vehicles. Additionally, the companies would each contribute a dollar amount of increased CVA over the next three years, $260 million in total. Finally, the companies would be required to consult with government representatives at regular intervals in order to monitor their progress under the letters of undertaking. The manufacturers, who had been consulted on every aspect and detail of the negotiations, had done well. Given the projected growth in the Canadian market, the requirements were not onerous, while the benefits of the new arrangement were potentially tremendous.
Nonetheless, during the negotiations there had been significant differences of opinion among the auto makers on the agreement. General Motors was less partial to the plan as their mid-1960s production in Canada was already achieving some significant economies of scale, but came to embrace it. Chrysler, in contrast, was keen towards the agreement immediately, and rationalized their production most quickly after 1965. In the end all agreed to the new regime, recognizing the potential benefits for the industry, and by the late 1960s all the Big Three auto makers defended the arrangement, and were determined to see its continuation. See Dimitry Anastakis, "Auto Pact: Business and Diplomacy in the Creation of a Borderless North American Auto Industry, 1945 Industry, -1971 1965. An AFL-CIO memo argued that "the Canadian auto tariff agreement amounts to a blackmail arrangement that could, at best in the short run, work out to the best interest of some of the Canadian workers. In the long run, it could hurt all workers by leading to overcapacity in the two nations." Weinberg to Irv Bluestone, "Canadian Auto Trade Agreement," 20 February 1965.
Following the agreement's signing, government officials were in no hurry to hear Burt out, and when he finally met with Minister of Labour Allan MacEacben in March 1965, little had been done to assuage the director's concerns. Since no worker protection plan had been formulated by the government, Burt reminded MacEachen of the six provisions the union had insisted upon as the price of their support for the agreement. Burt also stressed the tripartite board, an idea which, he reminded MacEachen, had been given "strong encouragement" by Deputy Minister of Labour George Haythome in January.
3
When the union was informed later that month mat 1,600 Ford workers at Windsor would be laid off indefinitely -still without any additional protection from the government -Burt was incensed. He complained to MacEachen that though the union had been promised something to alleviate dislocation, mere was nothing in place to protect these workers. Nor had there been any movement on the tripartite board which he felt he had been promised. Burt could not hide his sense of betrayal. He feh he had been misled that a tripartite meeting would be called after MacEachen had met with management, and made this clear to the minister. "Apparently we did not get through to you on mis angle although I was of the opinion that you had agreed with us." MacEachen could offer nothing but assurances that something was being done. 40 Finally, in June 1965 the government announced its program for auto industry workers, the Transitional Assistance Benefit (TAB). The program provided weekly benefits of 62 per cent of the laid-off worker's weekly earnings, a dependence allowance of 2.5 per cent of weekly earnings per dependent, and a total weekly benefit that could not exceed 65 per cent of the average weekly wages and salaries in the automotive and parts industries. In other words, the most a worker thrown off the job because of the auto pact could receive was $75 a week. Minister of Labour MacEachen lauded the program, and claimed that since the agreement was a great benefit to the Canadian economy, it was only reasonable that other Canadians and their employers would help displaced auto workers. MacEachen failed to mention, however, that the Canadian government felt pressure to enact some worker assistance only after it became clear that US legislation creating worker protection would be enacted as part of the auto pact's passage. Notwithstanding MacEachen's platitudes, the TAB fell far short of the union's expectations. It did not fulfill any of the six requirements that the union had demanded. Union members viewed it as nothing but a clever slight of hand: the TAB merely took the place of union negotiated supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB), and could not exceed those levels. By some union estimates, the program cut a worker's earnings almost in half. In fact, because most of the companies never signed on to the TAB, only at those companies where no SUB existed did the TAB funds come into use.
42 Dislocated auto workers, especially those at the Big Three, would get the employee-employer funded SUB instead of the TAB. When compared with US transitional assistance legislation, the government's bill offered less compensation than did the American proposal, a fact that was quickly exploited by union representatives and opposition members alike, though to little effect.
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For Burt, the TAB left him no choice but to condemn the program and call for "a campaign of attack" against the agreement. After ignoring the repeated pleas of the union, the government had taken six months to act and now, Burt argued, "it was a case of too little too late." In a special "Administrative Letter" to the Canadian region (the first of its kind), Burt called upon the union to create a Committee on the Auto Program to "do its utmost to influence the Canadian public against the automotive trade agreement." Burt was particularly displeased to read that MacEachen was giving the UAW credit for helping him to create the assistance plan, which the Canadian director denied.
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By the end of 1965, however, it was evident that Burt's outburst had produced more light than heat. When the government proved immovable on the TAB issue, Burt realized that it was senseless for the union to launch a full-scale attack on the agreement. He was convinced that "the plusses [of the agreement] far outweigh the minuses," and that the union, now faced with a "massive and complicated accomplished fact," should simply make the best of it. Moreover, it was becoming clear that the agreement was actually benefiting the union: at the September 1965 Canadian council meeting Burt restated the union's support of the principle behind the Ford, which had laid off 1,600 workers, was the first to indicate that it would not sign on to the program. Union leaders were perplexed at why the company would not sign on to the TAB, which would cost the company only slightly more than the SUB. ing the process mat led to the auto pact were being led by Communist-influenced auto workers. American domination was also an issue of particular significance to the Canadian UAW during this period. During the 1960s the union felt tension between the International leadership, which looked to forge an international and continental approach to the union's problems, and the nationalistic locals, which, whatever their political affiliation, remained at odds with policies which subsumed Canadian sensitivities. When the idea of integration on a continental basis was first presented to the membership in 1960 during the Bladen Commission, the latent tensions which had existed within the union since the 1940s were revived. This factionalism was further fuelled by the renewed economic nationalism which was becoming popular in Canada in the early 1960s, epitomised by the writings and political success of Walter Gordon and others.
5 ' To his surprise, Bladen would receive three separate submissions from the Canadian UAW. The first brief, tabled by Burt, spelled out the Canadian region's (and the International's) official position, and echoed the union's July 1960 cabinet presentation. The Canadian UAW leadership argued that the sector's difficulties could be solved by integrating its production with the US. In the long run, such continentalism would be beneficial if the plan guaranteed proportional parallel growth of employment and production in Canada with the growth of sales. Careful and cautious integration, then, was the solution the UAW hierarchy offered as its panacea to the problems of the Canadian auto industry.
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Nationalistic locals such as Local 444 (Chrysler-Windsor), in contrast, condemned such continental integration outright. Not only would it threaten Canadian independence, but integration would give "to the big monopoly Corporations who control US industry the right to choke off Canadian jobs." Local 444 saw any form of integration as a plot to undermine Canadian national development and bring about the country's deliberate subordination to a foreign country. Instead, the local proposed that increased Canadian content, and, eventually, an "All-Canadian-Car" should be the focus of the government's labours. The means by which to achieve this goal would be the crown corporation, a "logical step" which would improve efficiency, lower costs, and enable Canadian manufacturers to compete with imports. Local 444 was not content to simply pass judgement on its own industry, however, and recommended that the Canadian government embark on a "fundamental reappraisal" of ail basic policies with the us in order to free Canada from American eco- nomic and political domination. The GM Intra-Corporation Council took an equally nationalistic approach in its submission. Any idea which relinquished more control to US interest would be tantamount to "subverting [the] national interest and tolerating unemployment as a policy."
54
The Bladen Commission thus fanned the factionalism between the union's self-proclaimed Left Caucus and Burt's Reuther-leaning directorship. During its June 1960 meeting, the district council voted unanimously in favour of the union's July "official" brief to the government. According to Burt, conditions began to deteriorate when the Canadian Tribune, the organ of the Communist Party in Canada, shifted its view on integration. In an August article, the Tribune condemned integration, and called for an all-Canadian Car. After the Tribune article was published, Local 444 leader Charles Brooks and Local 199 (GM-St. Catharines) vice-president Gordon Lambert challenged the integration idea in the council, and threatened to submit briefs to the commission. Burt, who considered Brooks and Lambert Communist sympathizers, privately condemned them as "trouble-makers" whose position damaged the union significantly. In any event, they were strong supporters of the nationalist cause within the UAW and found willing supporters amongst the union's anti-continentalist and militant members.
55
At a September 1960 meeting, Brooks and Lambert resigned from the Canadian council and the sub-committee responsible for the Bladen submission. In an effort to address the nationalist concerns, Burt suggested that the union submit two briefs, one supporting integration, the other in favour of an all-Canadian Car. The motion, however, was defeated, and Brooks and Lambert returned to their respective locals to gather support for separate briefs. At Windsor, Brooks' Local 444 voted to produce a separate brief to the commission. Lambert had somewhat of a more difficult time convincing his supporters to accept the anti-integration position. As vice-president of Local 199, his motion to submit a separate brief was defeated by his own membership. But in the GM Intra-Corporation Council (Lambert 6 More ominously, Reuther soon had trouble in his own backyard. Warren Mike, President of Detroit Local 368, complained that because of the remission plan almost one half of his members would soon be jobless. Anything that might offset "this unfair Canadian subsidization that is draining US jobs to Canada" would be welcome. He suggested that the international and its president exert "some quiet political intervention" to get a ruling declaring the Canadian program a bounty.
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Reuther probably would have done so had his union not included a Canadian section. Instead, when it came time for the union to draft a letter of opinion to the Commissioner of Customs, the international president had no choice but to consider the demands of his Canadian brothers and sisters. According to Burt, the remission plan had the "overwhelming support of the Canadian people and the members of our union in Canada." 63 Since the plan was so well-liked by Canadian autoworkers, Burt was determined to ensure that the union's letter was as well-balanced an opinion as possible, and he carefully inspected the UAW letter. He demanded that every suggestion, "no matter how mild," that US workers were being 
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Nat Weinberg, the exasperated UAW research director, complained to Reuther that Burt's demands were unrealistic. Weinberg was sure that US workers were being hurt by the program, and he considered it "totally unreasonable" that Canadian problems were being given more emphasis than American difficulties. Even more galling for Weinberg, he believed that the plan did indeed constitute a bounty, a sentiment he expressed in no uncertain terms to Canadian consulate staff in Detroit When consulate officials asked where the solution to this problem might lie, Weinberg pointed to the proposals in the union's "official" Bladen Commission brief, specifically the recommendation to integrate the two industries. 63 Fortuitously for Weinberg and his colleagues, the cross-border conflict over the remission plan did not come to a head when it became clear that the two governments were indeed looking towards greater integration. The duty remission plan exposed the limits of "international unionism," the auto pact proving as much of a solution for the inter- Charles Brooks and Gordon Lambert were members of the Special Committee.
worker who had only been receiving the former. Since the car companies had refused to sign on to the TAB, it had only been offered at companies where no SUB had been negotiated. Further, at those companies where SUB existed (primarily the Big Three), the workers who had taken SUB had permanently depleted those credits and they would not be replenished by the company. Burt was certain that the government was "going to move" on the issue. Just to be on the safe side, the Canadian director wrote Nicholson in April, verifying their discussions at the meeting, repeating the proposal, and reiterating that Nicholson and his deputy minister (who had also attended the meeting) were both "sympathetic to this approach."
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By June 1966 it was clear that Nicholson and the government were not going to implement the changes to the TAB suggested by the union. When Burt inquired as to why nothing had been done, Nicholson responded that he had favoured the changes, but that they "did not prove feasible." Again, Burt felt betrayed by the government HeremmdedmeministerthatNicholsc«nadagreedmpririch)letothe union proposals, had verified that acceptance in April, and that Nicholson had not implied otherwise in his response. "With this kind of welshing on the deal that you already agreed to," Burt complained, he could make no other conclusion but that Nicholson was simply afraid of the auto companies. So enraged was he that Burt could not help but challenge the minister's honour "I will certainly keep in mind in the future this experience because apparently an agreement with you and your deputy is not worth a great deal." Even though Nicholson countered that "no agreement had been made" and that cabinet had decided that "it would be best to make no change in the [TAB] arrangements," Burt could not help but feel that "we have suffered a double cross" from Nicholson "and his associates." The agreement stated that no later than January 1968 the two governments would undertake a comprehensive review of the progress made towards achieving the goals which had been set out in the pact In late 1967, Canadian officials initiated discussions with their American counterparts to gauge the disposition of the American government on the agreement From the Canadian perspective, the agreement was doing its job: exports to the US had increased from $102 million in 1964 to $250 million in 1965 and $886 million in 1966. More importantly for Canadian policy makers, the auto deficit which had been such a problem in the early 1960s was greatly diminished: from a massive $700 million deficit in 1965, the difference was a much-more manageable $230 million, a shift of nearly $400 million. Employment in the industry had also increased, from 60,300 workers in 1963 to 83,400 workers in 1968, as facilities were expanded and dozens of new plants opened.
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With such a surge in production and employment, it was in the union's best interests to play a role in the review, and McDermott quickly attempted to make his presence felt with the government As the December 1967 intergovernmental consultations began, Minister of Trade, Commerce, and Industry Jean-Luc Pepin had not yet invited McDermott or the union to the discussion table. The union complained publicly that because "the discussions have taken place behind such a veil of secrecy ... it is impossible for us or the general public to know precisely what questions are at issue." When the government announced at the end of August 1968 that the review was complete, McDermott realized that the union had been had. Pepin had not once included the UAW in its deliberations, and conducted the review "while completely ignoring the legitimate concern and desire of the UAW to represent its members who are so obviously involved in this agreement." When President Lyndon Johnson issued a special report in September, stating that further consultations would take place, the union knew that it would have to press its case even more forcefully if it was to be included in the discussions. 75 Pepin finally did 
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When another round of discussions began in November 1969, the union again pleaded with the government to grant it an audience, and again die government refused to allow the union to take part The union protested to Pepin that he had not consulted with it over the future of the agreement. The UAW was also certain that its last meeting had resulted in a ministerial promise for union consultation before further discussion took place, a promise that the union felt had been broken. Pepin held that the meetings with the Americans were not negotiations, but a "preliminary exchange of views" on the development of the pact. As negotiations with the Americans continued into the early 1970s, the union remained on the outside, unable to effectively voice its support for the agreement, and especially for the Canadian safeguards.
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McDermott and the union had somewhat better luck with die TAB. Long a bone of contention, the haphazard and ineffective application of the TAB resulted in harrowing stories of unfair treatment for dislocated workers. At Local 199,12 workers were denied TAB because they lacked the requisite 30 consecutive weeks of employment. Nine of those twelve were women who had been on maternity leave, while the remaining three had been on sick leave. A number of the women had as much as twelve years seniority. When cases such as these were brought to the attention of the government and the press, the new Minister of Labour, Bryce Mackasey, was finally forced to review the TAB regulations. In December, 1968, the government introduced amendments to the TAB shortening the requisite employment period to receive benefits from 30 to 16 weeks and extending the program until 1973. Finally, the government amended the program so that dislocated workers could draw upon the TAB even if they were at a company that had SUB. While this had been a long-standing demand of the union's, the situation remained unsatisfactory in that the TAB benefits were only 75 per cent of the SUB. Mackasey even remarked mat he expected the vast majority of the dislocated workers to continue to draw the SUB first The union continued to push for more equitable worker assistance, a demand that had remained unfulfilled since 1965.
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Although they were unsatisfied by the TAB provisions and could not help but be disappointed at the lack of consultation with the government on the pact, by 1970 the union leadership and much of its membership were staunch defenders of the agreement. When the US auto trade surplus fell to unexpectedly low levels, and some Americans began to call for the treaty's abrogation, or at least a reworking of the agreement, the union leapt to the pact's defence. And when congressional pressure was especially acute after 1969, and the administration of Richard Nixon became committed to phasing out the Canadian safeguards, the union was adamant that the protections on production be retained.* 0 The union was convinced that the pact had been good for Canada, and it pressured Minister Pepin to ensure that the "letters of commitment" were not allowed to expire or be diluted in any way-the union wished to "see the Pact continue." Moreover, with booming production and employment, the pact largely smoothed over integration's divisive affects on the membership. (See Table 3 
IV. Conclusion
While auto labour historian Charlotte Yates has argued that the process leading to the auto pact and its implementation led to closer UAW-government relations, the evidence points to a growing antipathy between the union and the government in the 1960s. 85 In the months before the automotive agreement was signed in January 1965, the UAW was largely kept out of the negotiating process. The union had sporadic contact with government officials, and was given little information on the agreement. When the union did meet with government officials, its views were given short shrift, and repeated calls for worker protection were met with reluctance and indifference. While the union certainly held more meetings with govern- this path when an acceptable alternative-the conditional free trade offered by the auto pact, achieved all of their goals for the industry and the country's finances.
The pattern of government interaction with labour during the 1960s reflected the similar constraints upon the Canadian state: though the government would have liked to have had the Canadian union's official blessing for the auto pact regime, the constraints imposed by the situation -a desire to ensure the continued existence of the Canadian auto sector, the need to avoid a trade war with the US, the imperative of boosting the trade balance-meant that in the end, the union's support was not essential to successfully consummating the agreement. These realities and constraints precluded significant union participation in the issue, at least on the Canadian side of the border. In the us, Walter Reuther and the UAW leadership worked very closely with Johnson administration officials and congressional allies to ensure that the auto pact and its worker protection measures passed quickly and were effective.
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Further, government actors actually believed that their policies were beneficial for the industry, and that employment would improve because of the new regime, which would in time benefit the union and its members. Civil servants in the government of Canada may not have considered themselves economic nationalists in the Walter Gordon mould, but they did consider what they were doing to be advancing Canada's economic interests. 90 As Gordon himself admitted, the auto pact "meant a considerable capital investment in Canada to facilitate the great volume of production than was called for. It meant the creation of thousands of new jobs and it relieved our balance of payments difficulties," even if it tied Canada closer to the US. 91 Civil servants and their political masters felt that quickly consummating such a deal to achieve the benefits of the new continental arrangement was far more important than paying attention to the views of the union. Their paternal attitudes to- ward what was beat fia* aie industry was reflected in their lack of consultation on worker protection -civil servants "knew" that employment would improve, so there was no reason to create new worker protection plans.
92
Finally, peraonalities played something of a role. Relations between Burt and Industry Minister Drury grew increasingly hostile throughout the mid-1960s. On one occasion, in commenting on the government's unwillingness to discuss matters with the union. Butt wrote Reuther that, "My chief concern is the lack of cooperation by the government in allowing us to even act in an advisory capacity before things are done and this guy Drury is a son-of-a-b
." Another time, following a meeting in Ottawa between the two men, arguments spilled over into a basement corridor, and Burt went as far as to call the Minister "nuts" in public.
93 Simon Reisman, Deputy Minister of Industry at the time of the auto pact's signing and the lead civil servant involved with all government policy on die auto industry in the 1960s, was not sympathetic to the union leadership either. 94 These personality clashes further distanced the union from key policy makers within the government.
The government's reluctance to include the union in automotive policy considerations prompted a renewal of the long-standing tensions within the union between die continentalist-minded leadership and rank-and-file nationalists at a host of locals in the auto-producing belt in southern Ontario. The union leadership remained committed to die continental transformation of industiy, while die failure to ensure effective worker protection from the dislocating impact of the auto agreement caused difficulty for die leadership, and renewed hostilities with left-leaning sections of the union. The auto pact itself provoked serious division between mese factions. Nonetheless, by the end of the decade the continental regime was a reality, and the option of nationalizing the Canadian auto industry was closed, though the ideas of nationalist break from the UAW would remain salient for many Canadian UAW members.
Indeed, although nationalist elements within the Canadian UAW had not succeeded in preventing die integration of the Canadian and US auto industries, the battle over die fate of die union was far from over. Nationalists would continue to press for an independent Canadian auto union, eventually achieved by 1985 under the leadership of Bob White. As Yates has effectively argued, die militancy of elements of die Canadian union which had caused so much infighting in die 1960s 
